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Abstract
We study disclosure of information about the multidimensional state of the world
when uninformed receivers' actions aect the sender's utility. Given a disclosure rule,
the receivers form an expectation about the state following each message. Under
the assumption that the sender's expected utility is written as the expected value
of a quadratic function of those conditional expectations, we identify conditions under
which full and no disclosure is optimal for the sender and show that a linear transfor-
mation of the state is optimal if it is normally distributed. We apply our theory to
advertising, political campaigning, and monetary policy.
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1 Introduction
Controlling \market expectations" about the state of the world is important in various
situations. For example, a central bank has to control market expectations in order to
stabilize ination and the output gap around the desired values. A manufacturing rm needs
to build a good reputation for the quality of its product. A ruling political party wants to
maintain a high approval rating by being sensitive to voters' expectations about its policy
stance and competence. In order to control the information available to market participants,
a central bank designs a communication strategy (Blinder et al. (2008), Woodford (2005),
and others), a rm an advertising strategy (Anderson and Renault (2006), Johnson and
Myatt (2006)), and a political party a campaign strategy (Prat (2002), Polborn and Yi
(2006)).
In this paper, we analyze a model in which a privately informed sender discloses informa-
tion about the realization of the state to uninformed receivers, who then engage in economic
activities that aect the sender's utility. Through the choice of a disclosure rule that species
the information available to the receivers for each state of the world, the sender inuences
the receivers' belief. The question we address in this paper is, given the prior distribution of
the state, what disclosure rule maximizes the sender's expected utility.
Formally, a disclosure rule assigns to each realization of the state a probability distribution
over messages. As such, the disclosure rule determines the joint distribution of the state and
the message, which in turn determines the distribution of the receivers' belief. We assume
that the sender's expected utility, which is originally a function of the joint distribution of
the receivers' action prole and the state, is reduced in equilibrium to the expected value of
a quadratic function of the receivers' expectation of the state.1 Under this assumption, the
sender's problem is to control the distribution (more precisely, its second moments) of the
receivers' expectation of the state. A sucient condition on the underlying preferences for
this assumption is that both the sender and the receivers have quadratic utility functions
over the receivers' action prole and the state. Such a specication is common in models of
oligopoly, network externalities, and so on, and in the recent studies of transparency policy
including Morris and Shin (2007) and Cornand and Heinemann (2008) among others. We
show through our applications presented in Section 6 that this assumption is satised in a
number of applications such as monopoly advertising, political campaigning, and monetary
policy making.
1Chakraborty and Harbaugh (2010) study multidimensional cheap talk in a setting in which the sender's
preferences are described by a continuous (but not necessarily quadratic) utility function over the receivers'
conditional expectation. As illustrated in the next section, our formulation does not necessarily imply that
the sender has state-independent preferences.
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Our rst result identies when full and no disclosure is optimal (Theorem 1). In order
to investigate the optimality of partial disclosure rule, we begin by establishing an upper
bound of the sender's expected utility. We show that the upper bound depends only on
the second moments of the state and is obtained by solving a semidenite programming
problem (Theorem 2). To the best of our knowledge, the approach based on semidenite
programming is novel in the context of information disclosure.2 With this preparation, we
show that the optimal disclosure rule is given by a linear transformation of the state when it
is normally distributed (Theorem 3). We should emphasize that this is the rst result that
presents a complete and systematic derivation of the optimal disclosure rule, whether partial
or full, in a continuous state space.
We next examine the implications of our results in three applications. In Subsection
6.1, we consider the optimal advertising strategy of a monopoly rm privately informed
of its product quality and marginal cost, and show that its optimal advertising policy is
to reveal less information about its product quality than the socially optimal level. In
Subsection 6.2, we examine in a model of electoral competition the incentives of a political
party to reveal information about its candidate and show that incumbency advantage leads
to a socially inecient amount of information revelation to voters. In Subsection 6.3, we
formulate a two-period model of monetary policy and characterize the optimal disclosure
rule and stabilization policy.
Optimal disclosure of information has been studied in a number of dierent contexts,
including auctions (Milgrom and Weber (1982), Bergemann and Pesendorfer (2007), Board
(2009), Ganuza and Penalva (2010)), corporate nance (Admati and Peiderer (2000), Boot
and Thakor (2001)), interim performance evaluation (Aoyagi (2010), Goltsman and Mukher-
jee (2011)), transparency in policymaking (Gavazza and Lizzeri (2009), Prat (2005)), etc.
This paper is closely related to recent studies of Kamenica and Gentzkow (2011) and
Rayo and Segal (2010), who also investigate the optimal disclosure rule under alternative
specications of the state space and the sender's utility function. Kamenica and Gentzkow
(2011) study a general setting in which the sender needs to control the distribution of poste-
rior distributions and nd general properties of posteriors induced by the optimal disclosure
rule. They characterize the optimal disclosure rule in some simple settings, including when
the state space is binary. Rayo and Segal (2010) characterize the optimal (randomized) dis-
closure rule for the discrete state space when the sender has certain preferences. The main
contribution of our analysis is to identify optimal disclosure in the case where the state is
continuously distributed. A detailed discussion of our contribution is provided in Section 3.
2The same idea is also found in other applications of semidenite programming such as minimal trace
factor analysis and optimal experiment design (see, for example Vandenberghe and Boyd (1996)).
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In line with much of the literature including Kamenica and Gentzkow (2011) and Rayo
and Segal (2010), we assume that the sender can commit to her disclosure rule. While this is
a strong assumption, it is justiable in situations where the sender's information is veriable
ex post in the form of survey data, estimation results, experts' reports, and so on. In such
situations, reputational and legal concerns would stop the principal from deviating from
the pre-announced disclosure rule for a short-run gain. It is worth noting that the optimal
disclosure rule for the normally distributed state is a linear transformation, making it easy
to match the disclosed information with the private information. In this sense, it is more
credible than other complex rules. Although some recent papers assume that the sender can
commit to any disclosure rule (e.g., Goltsman and Mukherjee (2011)), most applied papers
assume a limited ability to commit to a disclosure rule and restrict the class of disclosure
rules the sender can choose from. For example, some papers including Shapiro (1986) and
Ederer (2010) examine when full disclosure is superior to no disclosure while Gal-Or (1986)
and Admati and Peiderer (2000) among others assume that the sender is able to choose
only the precision of messages the receivers observe so that a closed-form solution for the
sender's expected utility is obtained.
This paper also contributes to the growing literature on the social value of information.3
In applications, we discuss the divergence between private and social incentives to disclose
information in terms of informativeness of the messages generated by each disclosure rule.
One advantage of our multidimensional analysis is that it allows us to examine not only
the level but also the type of information that is revealed in equilibrium and at the social
optimum.4 For example, the optimal disclosure rule for a political party may reveal less
information about its general competence and too much about its policy stance than the
socially optimal disclosure rule.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents a motivating example. In Section 3,
we set up the model and discuss our key assumptions. Section 4 identies conditions under
which full and no disclosure is optimal and characterizes an upper bound of the sender's
expected utility. In Section 5, the optimal disclosure rule is explicitly obtained when the
state is normally distributed. Section 6 provides applications, and Section 7 concludes the
paper.
3For recent literature, see Morris and Shin (2002) and Angeletos and Pavan (2007) among others.
4For the measure of informativeness of disclosure rules, we follow Ganuza and Penalva (2010), who
propose precision criteria based on the variability of conditional expectations. Especially, if the conditional
expectation induced by a disclosure rule is normally distributed, its variance can measure the precision of
the message generated.
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2 Motivating Example
To provide a concrete example of what we analyze and what our assumption does and
does not mean, we begin with a simple example in which a sender discloses information to two
receivers who then take actions. This example illustrates how our reduced-form formulation
arises in settings with quadratic preferences over the receivers' actions and the state. This
motivating example is also useful in identifying the key issues that the theorems presented
below resolve.
An organization consists of a principal with private information and two agents (i = 1; 2)
who are hired by the principal to sell her products. The agents simultaneously choose the
target consumers ai 2 R and their prots depend on agent-specic market condition xi 2 R
as well as on the action prole (a1; a2). In particular, we suppose that agent i has a utility
function
ui(a1; a2; x1; x2) =  (ai   xi)2   (ai   a i)2
and that the principal has
v(a1; a2; x1; x2) =  
2X
i=1
(ai   xi)2   (a1   a2)2
where   0 and   0 measure the relative importance of coordination between two
agents.5 Each agent has incentives to adapt to the state in order to reduce the adaptation
loss, (ai   xi)2, and to choose a similar target in order to reduce the coordination loss,
(ai   a i)2, which may arise due to network externalities, reputations, economics of scale,
and so on. The principal is privately informed about (x1; x2), interpreted as the information
about her products and market conditions which may be estimated from past records. The
prior distribution of the state is common knowledge.6 How should the principal disclose her
private information? When is full disclosure optimal?
A (deterministic) disclosure rule is a mapping g : R2 !M that assigns to each realization
of the state a message m 2 M where the message space M is also chosen by the principal.
Although we consider a more general class of (possibly randomized) disclosure rules in the
following sections, we begin by comparing the following three disclosure rules; full disclosure
gf (x1; x2) = (x1; x2) 2 R2, which discloses full information; no disclosure gn(x1; x2) = 0 2 R,
5Use of a coordination game with quadratic preferences is common in organization economics. Our model
follows Alonso et al. (2008), Calvo-Armengol and de Mart (2009), Calvo-Armengol et al. (2009) and Dessein
and Santos (2006).
6Our formulation allows any correlation between x1 and x2.
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which discloses a completely uninformative message; and average disclosure ga(x1; x2) =
(x1 + x2)=2 2 R, which discloses a sample mean of two variables.
The timing of the game is as follows. First, the principal commits to a disclosure rule
g 2 fgf ; gn; gag. Second, the state of the world is realized, and a message m = g(x1; x2) is
disclosed according to the disclosure rule. Third, given the disclosure rule and the message,
the agents form a posterior belief and choose actions.
First, we derive the agents' equilibrium strategies and the principal's expected utility.
Given g and m 2M , two agents play a game whose unique Nash equilibrium is, for i = 1; 2,
ai (m) =(1   )E[xijm] +  E[x ijm]
where  = =(1 + 2). The equilibrium strategy is linear in the conditional expectations.
Therefore we denote the equilibrium strategy prole by a(x^1; x^2) = (a1(x^1; x^2); a

2(x^1; x^2))
where x^j  E(xjjm) is the agents' estimate of the state. Notice that a prior distribution of
the state and a disclosure rule specify the joint distribution of (x1; x2; x^1; x^2), which deter-
mines the joint distribution of (x1; x2; a

1; a

2) in equilibrium. We now rewrite the principal's
expected utility. The adaptation loss is written as
E(ai   xi)2 =E(x^1;x^2)

Exi

(ai )
2   2aixi + x2i jx^1; x^2

=E(x^1;x^2)

(ai )
2   2ai x^i

+ E(x^1;x^2)

E
 
x2i jx^1; x^2

=E(x^1;x^2)
 x^2i +  2  x^21   2x^1x^2 + x^22+ Ex2i :
Similarly, the coordination loss is
E(a1   a2)2 = E(x^1;x^2)

(1  2 )  x^21   2x^1x^2 + x^22 :
Thus, the principal's expected utility is written as
E(x1;x2;x^1;x^2)v(a(x^1; x^2); x1; x2)
= 
2X
i=1
E(ai (x^1; x^2)  xi)2   E(a1(x^1; x^2)  a2(x^1; x^2))2
=E(x^1;x^2)

(1  )(x^21 + x^22) + 2x^1x^2
  Ex21   Ex22
where   (22+)=(1+2)2. Since Ex21 and Ex22 are independent of the disclosure rule, the
principal's problem is reduced to the maximization of Ev^(x^1; x^2) + c where c is a constant
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Table 1: Comparison among the three rules.
Rule No Full Average
var(x^1) 0 1=12 1=24
var(x^2) 0 1=12 1=24
cov(x^1; x^2) 0 0 1=24
Rank of Ev
for  <  3rd 1st 2nd
for  <  <  3rd 2nd 1st
for  >  2nd 3rd 1st
The thresholds are  = (1 + 4)=2 and  = 1 + 4 + 22.
and v^ is a quadratic function dened by
v^(x^1; x^2) = (1  )(x^21 + x^22) + 2x^1x^2: (1)
Note that in general the disclosure rule cannot aect the expected value of the estimates,
that is Ex^i = EE(xijm) = Exi. Note also that the second moments are given by Ex^2i =
var(x^i) + (Exi)2 and Ex^1x^2 = cov(x^1; x^2) + (Ex1)(Ex2). From these observations, we have
Ev(a; x1; x2) =(1  )(var(x^1) + var(x^2)) + 2cov(x^1; x^2)
  var(x1)  var(x2)   (Ex1   Ex2)2 :
Since the second line is independent of the disclosure rule, the principal's expected utility is
also expressed as a linear function of variance-covariances of the estimates (plus a constant
term).
It is worth noting that the expected utility conditional on each message is not necessarily
written as v^(x^1; x^2) + c. The former is expressed as
E [v(a; x1; x2)jm] = v^(x^1; x^2)  E(x21 + x22jm):
The second term in the right-hand side may change as what message is disclosed while its
average is determined by the prior distribution but not the disclosure rule. For any disclosure
rule, the expectation of the conditional expectation becomes the unconditional expectation
so that Em[E[(x21 + x22)jm]] = E(x21 + x22).
We now evaluate the performances of the three disclosure rules. For ease of exposition,
we assume that x1 and x2 are independent and uniformly distributed on [ 1=2; 1=2]. Table
7
1 gives the characteristics of the three deterministic disclosure rules. The rst three rows
report the variances and covariance of the estimates while the last three rows report the
ranking of the principal's expected utility. Given  > 0, there are two thresholds for ;
  (1 + 4)=2 and   1 + 4 + 22. Full disclosure is superior to average disclosure for
 <  while the reverse holds for  > . Intuitively, when the principal puts a lower weight
on coordination ( < ), the principal should disclose full information in order to induce
adaptation even if it may cause mis-coordination. In contrast, when the coordination is
important ( > ), the principal induces similar decisions by disclosing the average state.
Several questions arise. What is the optimal disclosure rule? Is a higher covariance
between x^1 and x^2 incompatible with a higher variance of each x^i? What determines the
limit of information disclosure as a means of controlling expectations? In the following
sections, we will answer these questions and nd that in the above example full and average
disclosure is indeed optimal among the general class of disclosure rules when the state is
uniformly distributed.7
3 The Model
A sender privately observes the multidimensional state x = (x1; : : : ; xk)
0 2 Rk where
x has a density over a convex support in Rk with a non-empty interior, zero mean and a
positive denite variance matrix .8 The sender publicly discloses information about the
realization of the state to uninformed receivers who then engage in economic activities such
as consumption, investment, etc. that aect the sender's utility.
For the inducement of preferred actions, the sender controls what information to make
available to the receivers by choosing a disclosure rule (;M), which consists of a measurable
set M of messages and a family of conditional probability distributions f(jx)gx over M .
We assume that the disclosure rule (;M) is such that the conditional expectation E[xjm]
exists for every m 2 M and so does its second moment var(E[xjm]).9 Let x^  E[xjm]
be the conditional expectation given m, call the estimates. A disclosure rule induces a
joint distribution of (x;m), and hence a joint distribution of (x; x^). This denition includes
the following communication strategies that are common in the literature of information
economics; full disclosure, that reveals the realization of the state; no disclosure, that reveals
no information; noisy communication, that adds white noises to the sender's observation;
partition, that reveals an element of the partition over the state space that contains the
7In Section 5, we also characterize the optimal disclosure rule when the state is normally distributed.
8We denote by A0 the transpose of matrix A. Throughout the paper, all untransposed vectors are column
vectors.
9A sucient condition is that the support of x is a compact set in Rk.
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state. The disclosure rule is deterministic if there exists a function g : Rk ! M such that
m = g(x) almost surely.10 As we have seen in the previous section, disclosing the average
value of the state, m = g(x) =
P
xi=k, is an example of a deterministic disclosure rule. In
contrast, disclosing noisy messages, mi = xi + "i where "i  N(0; 2i ), is a typical example
of a stochastic disclosure rule.
As discussed in the introduction, we consider situations in which the sender controls the
receivers' actions, denoted by a, through information disclosure. Let v(a;x) be the sender's
utility function. In what follows, we make the following two assumptions. First, we suppose
that the receivers' behavior is simply a continuous function of their conditional expectation
of the state. We denote their actions given x^ = E[xjm] by a(x^). Under this assumption,
the sender's problem is to control the joint distribution of x and x^ so as to maximize her
expected utility E(x;x^)v(a(x^);x). Second, there exists a kk symmetric matrix V such that
for any disclosure rule,
E(x;x^)v(a(x^);x) = Ex^ [x^0V x^] + c (2)
where c is a constant that is independent of the disclosure rule. Let v^(x^) = x^0V x^. A sucient
condition is that the receivers' equilibrium strategies are given by an ane function of their
conditional expectations and the sender has a quadratic utility function over a and x. We
call Ev^(x^) the gain from a disclosure rule.11
As briey discussed in the previous section, the law of iterated expectations plays a key
role in deriving such a representation. First, the expected value of the product a(x^)  xi is
expressed as the expected value of a function of the estimates. That is, E(x;x^)[a(x^)xi] =
Ex^[a(x^)x^i]. Second and more importantly, the expected utility conditional on the message,
E[v(a(x^);x)jm], is not necessarily written as v^(x^)+c. For example, suppose that the sender
has v(a; x) =  (a x)2 and the receiver has u(a; x) =  (a x)2 so that the receiver chooses
a = x^. Then the sender's expected utility conditional on m is E[v(a; x)jm] = x^2 E[x2jm]
while v^(x^) = x^2. Although the disclosure rule aects the distribution of Ex[x2jm], it cannot
aect its average value Em[Ex[x2jm]] = Ex2. Thus, our formulation may apply when the
sender's conditional expected utility given each m cannot be written as a quadratic function
of the estimates.
An important consequence of our assumptions is that the sender's expected utility can
10Note that every deterministic disclosure rule can be represented by a partition and vice versa. For
example, a message m under a deterministic rule g is equivalent to disclosing its inverse image g 1(m) =
x 2 Rk : g(x) = m	.
11This terminology is due to Kamenica and Gentzkow (2011), who dene it to be the dierence between
the sender's expected utilities under a disclosure rule and no disclosure. In this paper, no disclosure induces
x^ = 0 and hence Ev = c.
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be expressed as Ex^ [x^0V x^]+ c = tr(V ^)+ c where ^  E [x^x^0] denotes the second moment of
the estimates.12 There are two key features of the sender's problem that immediately follow
from this equality: (i) if two disclosure rules induce the same ^, they yield the same expected
utility, and (ii) given ^, it is easy to compute the sender's expected utility, tr(V ^) + c.13
Although such a reduced-form formulation can be generated in dierent ways from the
underlying preferences of the receivers and their equilibrium behaviors as illustrated in the
previous section, there are important cases that cannot be reduced to our model. The rst
case is where the receivers' action space is discrete. In the above simple example, if the action
space is given by f 1; 1g, then the receiver's action is not continuous in his expectation of
the state.14 Second, even when the receiver's behavior is given by a continuous function of
the estimates, the sender's utility function should not be too complex. For example, suppose
that a(x^) = x^ and v(a; x) =  (a + 1)2(a   1)2. Then the sender's expected utility cannot
be expressed in the form of (2).
Rayo and Segal (2010) study optimal information disclosure where the sender's expected
utility is written as Ex^1x^2+ c, and characterize the optimal randomized disclosure rule for a
nite state space. Since we assume that the state has a continuous distribution, our analysis
is based on dierent techniques and applicable to common distributions such as uniform
and normal. In Section 5, we will nd that the disclosure of a weighted average becomes a
solution to their problem when the state is normally distributed.15
Kamenica and Gentzkow (2011) consider a general problem where the sender's expected
utility is expressed as the expected value of a function of the receiver's posterior belief and
characterize the posterior beliefs induced by the optimal disclosure rule. They provide the
optimal (partial) disclosure rule in simple settings, especially when the state space is binary.
They also analyze whether no disclosure is suboptimal for the setting in which the sender's
utility depends only on the receiver's conditional expectation of the state. Although we
make a stronger assumption on the sender's preferences, we provide a simple and complete
characterization of the optimal disclosure rule in the continuous state space, which is useful
for applied research.
12For any rule (;M), we have E[x^0V x^] = E[tr(x^0V x^)] = E[tr(V x^x^0)] = tr(V E[x^x^0]) = tr(V ^) where
tr(A) is the trace of matrix A.
13Even though this operation itself does not rely on the assumption that x^ is the receivers' conditional
expectation of x, we often use it when we derive matrix V . In the above simple example, we use it when we
compute E(x;x^)xa(x^) = Ex^2.
14In such a case, the receiver takes a = 1 (=  1) if x^  (<)0, respectively. That is, the rst assumption
is not satised. In this case, the sender's expected utility is expressed as E(x;x^)v(a; x) = 1+2bE(jx^j) Ex2.
15One can also show that, by applying Theorem 2 presented below, the average disclosure is optimal if
(x1; x2) is uniformly distributed over [0; 1]
2.
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4 Optimal Disclosure and Semidenite Programming
First, we identify when full and no disclosure is optimal and when partial disclosure yields
a higher expected utility than full and no disclosure. Detailed proof is in Appendix A
Theorem 1 (i) Full disclosure is optimal if and only if v^ is a convex function or, equiva-
lently, V is positive semidenite. (ii) No disclosure is optimal if and only if v^ is a concave
function or, equivalently, V is negative semidenite.
The if parts, which simply follow from Jensen's inequality and the law of iterated ex-
pectations, are already known in the literature. The only if part of (ii) is also found in
Kamenica and Gentzkow (2011)[Proposition 3], who analyze a setting in which the sender
has a continuous but not necessarily quadratic utility function over conditional expectations.
In contrast, the only if part of (i) is novel and relies on the quadraticity of v^. To illustrate
the main idea behind the proof, consider the following example: suppose that V =
 
1 2
2 1
!
,
which is not a positive semidenite matrix so that there is a vector x  =
 
1
 1
!
that satises
x0 V x  < 0. Then any x can be expressed as x = x+ + x  where x+ =
 
1
1
!
. We argue
that a partial disclosure rule that reveals only  yields a higher gain than full disclosure that
reveals both  and . When only  is disclosed, the estimate is given by
x^ = x+ + E(j)x ;
and then the realization of the state is written as
x = x^+ (   E(j))x : (3)
Indeed, if the sender reveals the realization of  in addition to , an additional variation in
the receivers' expectation, (   E(j))x , is generated. Using the expression of (3), the
sender's gain from full disclosure can be written as follows:
E [x0V x] =E

[x^+ (   E(j))x ]0 V [x^+ (   E(j))x ]

=E [x^0V x^] + 2E

E

(   E(j))x0 V x^j

+ E

(   E(j))2x0 V x 

=E [x^0V x^] +
 
x0 V x 

E [var(j)] :
Since E [var(j)] > 0 and x0 V x  < 0, we have E[x0V x] < E[x^0V x^]. Intuitively, compared
with full disclosure, the partial disclosure specied above reduces an unfavorable variability
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of conditional expectations. Hence, full disclosure is suboptimal whenever V is not positive
semidenite.
The proof of the only if part of (ii) in Appendix is based on a reverse argument that,
compared with no disclosure, the sender can generate a favorable variability of conditional
expectations if V is not negative semidenite. In particular, the sender controls information
so that the conditional expectations lie on a vector x+ such that x
0
+V x+ > 0.
For the purpose of use in applications in Section 6, we restate Theorem 1 for the case of
k  2.
Corollary 1 For the one-dimensional state space (k = 1), full disclosure is optimal if and
only if V  0 and no disclosure is optimal if and only if V  0. For the two-dimensional
state space (k = 2), full disclosure is optimal if and only if V11; V22; det(V )  0 and no
disclosure is optimal if and only if V11, V22; det(V )  0.
In the motivating example, V is positive semidenite if and only if   (1+4)=2, which
coincides with the condition for the optimality of full disclosure among the three simple
rules. So far we know little about what disclosure rule is optimal when  > (1 + 4)=2 in
the example.
To investigate the optimality of partial disclosure, we begin by establishing an upper
bound of the sender's expected utility (or equivalently the gain) attainable through infor-
mation control. Recall that in general E[x^0V x^] = tr(V ^) where ^ = E [x^x^0] = var(x^).
Hereafter, we interpret the sender's problem as the choice of a variance matrix of x^ by
choosing a disclosure rule.
We now investigate conditions on ^ that can be induced by a disclosure rule. First we
know that (i) ^ must be positive semidenite since it is a variance matrix. Furthermore, for
any joint distribution of (x;m), the law of total variance holds;
var(x) =E[var(xjm)] + var(E(xjm))
where var(xjm) = E[(x   E[xjm])(x   E[xjm])0jm]. Since every variance matrix is positive
semidenite, so is its expectation E[var(xjm)].16 This implies that (ii)  ^ must be positive
semidenite. Let  denote the Lowner partial ordering on the set of kk symmetric positive
semidenite matrices. That is, for two symmetric positive semidenite matrices A and B,
A  B if A B is positive semidenite.17 LetO and I denote the zero and the identity matrix,
16For all non-zero vector z 2 Rk, we have z0E[var(xjm)]z = E[z0var(xjm)z]  0 since var(xjm) is positive
semidenite for any m 2M .
17For the standard notation in matrix algebra and some basic properties of matrices, see Horn and Johnson
(1985) and Boyd and Vandenberghe (2004).
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respectively. Then, every ^ must satisfy   ^  O. Roughly speaking, variance matrices of
the estimates induced by the disclosure rule are (partially) ordered by the matrix inequality
according to which full (no) disclosure attains the greatest (least) element. Therefore, an
upper bound on the gain is given by solving the following semidenite programming :
max
^O
tr(V ^):
To simplify the notation in the problem and its solution, it is useful to change the variable
in the above program. Let Z    12 ^  12 and W   12V  12 . Since the variance matrix
 is nonsingular, Z must be a symmetric positive semidenite matrix. Then the condition
  ^  O is equivalent to I  Z  O. It is straightforward to see that Z =   12  12 = I
for full disclosure and Z =  
1
2O 
1
2 = O for no disclosure. The gain is also written in
terms of Z and W as tr(V ^) = tr(WZ). Thus, an upper bound of the gain is characterized
as follows:
Lemma 1 Let W = 
1
2V 
1
2 . Then the upper bound of the gain is given by solving the
following semidenite programming:
(SDP) max
IZO
tr(WZ):
Before presenting the solution to SDP, it may be helpful to give an intuition of the
constraint   ^  O in the context of the motivating example in Section 2. Recall that
matrix V has entries V11 = V22 = 1  and V12 = V21 =  where  = (22+)=(1+2)2 (see
(1)). Moreover, we have assumed that x1 and x2 are independent and uniformly distributed
over [ 1=2; 1=2] so that  has 11 = 11 = 1=12 and 12 = 0. It immediately follows from
^  O (i.e., ^ is positive semidenite) that ^11  0, ^22  0 and ^11^22  ^212. That is,
the variances of the estimates are nonnegative and the correlation between two estimates,
corr(x^1; x^2) =
p
^212=(^11^22), is in [ 1; 1]. Similarly, from   ^ (i.e.,    ^ is positive
semidenite), we have 11  ^11, 22  ^22, and
(12   ^12)2 (11   ^11)(22   ^22): (4)
The rst two conditions imply that the variance of the estimate cannot exceed that of
the underlying state. It may make sense that any message about the state cannot be
more informative than revealing the state itself. The condition (4) implies that to gen-
erate a certain covariance of the estimates that diers from that of the underlying state
(cov(x^1; x^2) 6= cov(x1; x2)), the sender must induce lower variances of the estimates than
that under full disclosure (var(x^1) < var(x1) and var(x^2) < var(x2)). In the context of the
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z11 = z22
Figure 1: Solution to the semidenite programming
motivating example, this condition turns out to be an important trade-o for the principal.
Recall that both the adaptation and coordination losses are decreasing in ^12 = E(x^1x^2). To
induce a higher covariance between the two estimates, the sender must reduce the variance
of the estimates, which is also valuable to the principal whenever  < . Roughly speak-
ing, to facilitate coordination between the two agents, the principal needs to withhold some
information and reduce the degree of adaptation.
We now apply Lemma 1 to the problem in the motivating example and obtain an upper
bound of the gain. Since  = 1
12
I, we have Z = 12^ and W = 1
12
V . Moreover, the
constraint I  Z  O is expressed as (i) z11; z22  0, z212  z11z22, and (ii) z11; z22  1,
z212  (1  z11)(1  z22). Thus, SDP for the example is written as
(SDP) max
z11;z12;z22
1
12
[(1  )(z11 + z22) + 2z12]
subject to z11; z22 2 [0; 1]
z212  minfz11z22; (1  z11)(1  z22)g:
Notice that in order to relax the constraint on z12, we have to choose z11 = z22.
18 Then the
inequality constraint is reduced to z12  minfz11; (1   z11)g. Figure 1 depicts the feasible
set of (z11; z12) as a shaded area with the level curves of the objective function tr(WZ).
Recall that the solution Z to SDP corresponds to the variance matrix of the estimates as
^ = 
1
12Z
1
12 = 1
12
Z. If the slope w11=w12 = (1   )= of the level curves is greater than
1, the solution is (z11; z22; z12) = (1; 1; 0), or equivalently (^11; ^22; ^12) = (1=12; 1=12; 0),
which is achieved by full disclosure (see the rst three rows in Table 1). On the other
18For any (z11; z22) with z11 6= z22, consider ~z11 = ~z22 = (z11 + z22)=2. Since w11 = w22 = (1  )=12, we
have w11z11+w22z22 = w11~z11+w22~z
0
22. Moreover, z11z22 < ~z11~z22 and (1 z11)(1 z22) < (1  ~z11)(1  ~z22).
Thus we can relax the inequality constraint without altering the objective value.
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hand, if w11=w12 is less than 1, the solution is (z11; z12; z22) = (1=2; 1=2; 1=2), or equivalently
(^11; ^22; ^12) = (1=24; 1=24; 1=24), which is, indeed, what average disclosure achieves. Thus,
we nd that average disclosure attains the upper bound for  > (1 + 4)=2.
Corollary 2 In the motivating example with a prior xi
iid U [ 1
2
; 1
2
] for i = 1; 2, full disclo-
sure is optimal if   (1 + 4)=2 and average disclosure is optimal if  > (1 + 4)=2.
Although Lemma 1 provides a key insight into the control of conditional expectations,
we need some knowledge in matrix algebra to solve the program. Here we present a solution
to SDP and relegate its derivation to Appendix A.19
Theorem 2 Let Q+ = [q1; : : : ;qr] consist of the eigenvectors associated with the nonnega-
tive eigenvalues of W = 
1
2V 
1
2 . Then a projection matrix Z = PQ+ = Q+(Q
0
+Q+)
 1Q0+
is a solution to SDP. Moreover, the upper bound achieved equals the sum of all positive
eigenvalues of W .
An important implication for k = 2 is that the two estimates x^1 and x^2 must be perfectly
correlated when x1 and x2 are independent. To see this, suppose that 
2
i = var(xi) for i = 1; 2
and that V (and hence W ) is neither positive nor negative semidenite so that there exists
exactly one positive eigenvalue. Suppose also that V12 6= 0 so that the optimal disclosure rule
is nontrivial.20 Let (q1; q2) be the eigenvector associated with the unique positive eigenvalue.
Then the solution to SDP is given by
Z =
 
q21
q21+q
2
2
q1q2
q21+q
2
2
q1q2
q21+q
2
2
q22
q21+q
2
2
!
;
and the second moment of the estimates is
^ = 
1
2Z
1
2 =
 
21q
2
1
q21+q
2
2
1q12q2
q21+q
2
2
1q12q2
q21+q
2
2
22q
2
2
q21+q
2
2
:
!
Thus, the correlation between x^1 and x^2 equals q1q2=jq1q2j, which is either 1 or  1 whenever
both x^1 and x^2 have positive variances.
21 In other words, to achieve the upper bound, the
two estimates must satisfy a linear restriction x^2 = x^1 where the coecient is given by
 = 2q2=1q1. Another implication is that the solution to SDP satises z11 + z22 = 1. This
19If all eigenvalues of W is negative, the zero matrix Z = O achieves the upper bound as established in
Theorem 1.
20If x1 and x2 are independent and V12 = 0, then the optimal disclosure is g(x1; x2) = x1 when V11 >
0 > V22 and g(x1; x2) = x2 when V22 > 0 > V11.
21For mutually dependent states, we have corr(y^1; y^2) 2 f 1; 1g where

y^1
y^2

=  
1
2

x^1
x^2

.
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implies that two variables, z11 2 [0; 1] and  2 f 1; 1g, determine the other two variables
z22 and z12 as z22 = 1   z11 and z12 = 
p
z11(1  z11). From these observations, the search
for the upper bound is characterized as a simple maximization problem that does not need
to compute the positive eigenvalue: let  2 f 1; 1g and z 2 [0; 1] be parameters and h(; z)
be a function on f 1; 1g  [0; 1] dened by
h(; z) = 21V11z + 212V12
p
z(1  z) + 22V22(1  z):
Then we have maxh(; z) = max^O tr(V ^).
Although Theorem 2 tells us what distribution of the estimates should be induced by the
optimal disclosure rule, it tells little about how to construct a disclosure rule that induces
such a distribution of the estimates. While the upper bound characterized in Theorem 2
depends only on the second moment of the underlying distribution of the state, the optimal
rule may depend on the entire distribution of x since we have to obtain the conditional
expectations for each m. In general, there is little hope of nding a disclosure rule that
attains the upper bound. This leaves us with two choices: one is to investigate necessary
conditions for the optimal disclosure rule as in Kamenica and Gentzkow (2011) and Rayo
and Segal (2010), while the other is to characterize the optimal rules for some class of state
distributions. We take the second approach and identify optimal disclosure rules under the
assumption that the state has a normal distribution.
5 Normally Distributed State and Linear Disclosure
Rule
In this section, we characterize the optimal disclosure rule when the state has a normal
distribution. Specically, we suppose that x  N(0;) where  is symmetric and positive
denite.
A linear rule of rank l is a deterministic disclosure rule such that m = g(x) is a linear
transformation of rank l.22 For l  1, we can represent a linear rule by g(x) = A0x 2 Rl
where A is a k  l matrix of rank l.23 We can interpret a linear rule of rank l as a rule
publicizing l variables (m1; : : : ;ml) none of which is redundant. Note that full disclosure is
a linear rule of rank k such as g(x) = x and no disclosure rank zero such as g(x) = 0. Since
22That is, the dimension of the range of g equals l.
23If g maps each realization of the state into RL with L > l, there are L   l redundant variables, say
(ml+1; : : : ;mL), in the sense that E[xjm1; : : : ;mL] = E[xjm1; : : : ;ml]. Thus we can represent the linear rule
of rank l by a k  l matrix A without loss of generality.
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we know that no disclosure is optimal if and only if V is negative semidenite, so we suppose
that V is not negative semidenite.
When the state is normally distributed and a linear rule of rank l  1 is chosen, the
message m = A0x 2 Rl has a normal distribution with zero mean. The standard result of
the normal distribution gives the conditional expectation x^ = E[xjm] = A(A0A) 1m.24
Since m = A0x, we have
x^ = A(A0A) 1A0x:
Intuitively, a linear rule of rank l projects the realization of the state onto an l dimensional
subspace in which the estimates are distributed. It follows from the analogue of Theorem 1
that the optimal disclosure rule must induce a distribution of conditional expectations such
that V is positive semidenite on its support. That is, x^0V x^  0 for every x^ in its support.
Otherwise, we can reduce unfavorable variability of conditional expectations in a similar
manner to the only if part of Theorem 1 (i). This necessary condition eectively narrows
the set of potential solutions.
Let B   12A and PB = B(B0B) 1B0. The matrix PB is an orthogonal projection matrix
that maps vectors in Rk onto the column space of B. Then the estimates are x^ =  12PB 
1
2x,
and hence the second moment ^ is written as
^ = Ex^x^0 = 
1
2PB
1
2 :
Thus the gain of the disclosure rule is written as tr(V ^) = tr(V 
1
2PB
1
2 ) = tr(WPB) where
W = 
1
2V 
1
2 .
Consider a linear rule m = A0x such that A =  
1
2Q+ where, as denoted in Theorem
2, Q+ = [q1; : : : ;qr] is the eigenvectors associated with the nonnegative eigenvalues of W .
Then B = 
1
2A = Q+ and tr(WPB) = tr(WPQ+), which equals the upper bound identied in
Theorem 2. Thus, we nd a linear rule that is optimal among the general class of disclosure
rules.
Theorem 3 Suppose that the state is normally distributed, that is x  N(0;). Then a
linear rule g(x) = Q0+
  1
2x is optimal where Q+ = [q1; : : : ;qr] is the eigenvectors associated
24Consider the joint distribution (x;m)  N(~; ~) where the mean vector and variance matrix can be
partitioned as
~ =

~x
~m

; ~ =

~x;x ~x;m
~m;x ~m;m

:
It follows (see, for example Vives (2008)) then the conditional density of x givenm is normal with conditional
mean ~x + ~x;m ~
 1
m;m(m   ~m) and variance matrix ~x;x   ~x;m ~ 1m;m ~m;x. Now apply to m = A0x, we
have ~x;m = E[xx0A] = A and ~m;m = E[A0xx0A] = A0A.
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with the nonnegative eigenvalues of the symmetric matrix W = 
1
2V 
1
2 .
The optimal linear rule in Theorem 3 is interpreted as the following information process-
ing. First, the sender adjusts the variance of the state as y    12x so that var(y) = Ik.
Second, r variables (m1; : : : ;mr) is disclosed each of which is a linear combination mi =
q1iy1 +    + qkiyk of y where the weights (q1i; : : : ; qki) constitute an eigenvector associated
with a nonnegative eigenvalue of W .25
Here we briey discuss the role of two key properties in Theorem 3: the normality of
the state and the linearity of the disclosure rule. The rst remark is that there exists
Z 2 f ~Z : I  ~Z  Og such that it cannot be induced by the linear rule. Recall that
for any linear rule A (translated into B = 
1
2A), we have Z = PB = B(B
0B) 1B0. A
property of orthogonal projection matrices (that is, symmetric and idempotent) is that every
eigenvalue is either zero or one. Therefore, the linear rule cannot induce Z such that it has
an eigenvalue in (0; 1). Second, when the normality fails, the linear rule is no longer able to
achieve the upper bound identied in Theorem 2. For example, consider V =
 
1 1
1 0
!
and
xi
iid U [ 1=2; 1=2] for i = 1; 2 so that  = 1
12
I and W = 1
12
V . Then the upper bound is
given by the positive eigenvalue of W , which equals (1 +
p
5)=24  0:1348, while the linear
rule yields at most 86
27
 1
24
 0:1327 under g(x1; x2) = 3x1 + 2x2.
5.1 The Two-dimensional Normal State
We now apply the theory developed above to obtain the optimal disclosure rule under
the normally distributed state for k = 2. Let v^(x^) = x^0V x^ and (x1; x2)  N((0; 0);). From
Corollary 1, we focus on the case where V is indenite (i.e., neither positive nor negative
semidenite) and nd the optimal linear rule A of rank 1 that maximizes tr(V ^).26
We normalize the state and the estimates by y =  
1
2x and y^ =  
1
2 x^. First we see
how an orthogonal projection PB determines the distribution of y^. For B = (b1; b2)
0 2 R2,
we have y^ = PBy, or equivalently 8<:y^1 =
b1y1+b2y2
b21+b
2
2
b1
y^2 =
b1y1+b2y2
b21+b
2
2
b2:
25It is worth noting that if the rank of W is less than k, say k   n, then the rank of optimal linear
rule is indeterminate. Formally, letting Q++ = [q1; : : : ;qr n] be the eigenvectors associated with positive
eigenvalues, any linear rule A =  
1
2B such that B contains every column of Q++ but orthogonal to Q 
attains the same value. Hence the rank of an optimal linear rule may be r n or more but must be less than
or equal to r.
26If V is positive (negative) semidenite, full (no) disclosure which corresponds to a linear rule of rank 2
(0, respectively) is optimal.
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Thus we nd that (y^1; y^2) are distributed on the line b2y^1 = b1y^2. Moreover the variance
matrix of (y^1; y^2) is var(y^) = E[PByy0P 0B] = PB, or equivalently
var(y^1; y^2) =
 
c21 c1c2
c1c2 c
2
2
!
where (c1; c2) = (
b1p
b21+b
2
2
; b2p
b21+b
2
2
) is a point on the unit sphere in R2. This implies that the
sender's choice variable is essentially one-dimensional, and hence the optimization problem
can be solved by standard calculus.
Corollary 3 Suppose that V is indenite and W = 
1
2V 
1
2 . Then the optimal linear rule
is A =  
1
2B where B = (b1; b2)
0 2 R2 is such that: (i) if w12 = 0, then B = (1; 0)0 for
w22 < 0 < w11, and B = (0; 1)
0 for w11 < 0 < w22; (ii) if w12 = w21 6= 0, then
b1
b2
=
(w11   w22) +
p
(w11   w22)2 + 4w212
2w12
:
Corollary 3 characterizes the optimal linear rule when k = 2 as in the motivating example
and in Rayo and Segal (2010). In contrast to the nite state space case, the optimal disclosure
rule is deterministic and linear if the state has a bivariate normal distribution. For example,
for xi  N(0; 2i ) for i = 1; 2, the solution to the Rayo and Segal (2010)'s problem is the
linear rule g(x1; x2) = 
 1
1 x1 + 
 1
2 x2.
6 Applications
6.1 Optimal Advertising Policy
Suppose that a monopoly rm chooses an information disclosure policy about its new
product. In particular, the rm observes its cost shock xc and quality shock xa. Assume
that random variables xa and xc are independent and normally distributed with means zero
and variances 2a and 
2
c , respectively. A disclosure rule (;M) determines information m
available to consumers. For example, a computer manufacturer discloses various informa-
tion about its product including display resolution, battery life, processing speed, and so
on. A production company releases on-line free music/movie clips. By controlling infor-
mation revealed, the rm can induce a preferred distribution of the consumers' conditional
expectations about the product quality and production cost.
Suppose that a representative consumer has a quadratic utility function u(q; xa) = 
(a+ xa)q   12q2
   pq where q is the quantity consumed and p is the unit price. It fol-
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lows that the inverse demand function given message m is q = a+ x^a p where x^a = E[xajm]
is the consumer's conditional expectation about the quality shock. The rm's prot function
is v(q; xc) = pq   (c + xc)q. For simplicity, we assume that the price is exogenously xed.27
The timing of the game is as follows. First, the rm commits to a disclosure rule (;M).
Second, the rm observes the realization of the state (xa; xc) and discloses information m.
Third, the consumer estimates the product quality and determines the demand quantity.
The rm's expected prot is written as
Ev =E [(p  c  xc)(a+ x^a   p)]
=  Ex^ax^c + (p  c)(a  p):
Thus, we have v^(x^a; x^c) =  x^ax^c. An immediate implication is that the rm's expected
prot is a decreasing function of the covariance between x^a and x^c. Intuitively, the rm
is better o increasing the probability that demand expand when it has a lower cost. The
expected value of social welfare (i.e., consumer surplus plus the rm's prot) is
Ew =E

(a+ xa)q   1
2
q2

  (c+ xc)q

=E

1
2
x^2a   x^ax^c

+ (a  p)

a+ p
2
  c

so that the socially optimal disclosure rule maximizes the expected value of a quadratic
function w^(x^a; x^c) =
1
2
x^2a   x^ax^c.
From Corollary 3, the optimal disclosure rule for the rm is gP (xa; xc) = cxa   axc
while the socially optimal disclosure rule is gS(xa; xc) = xa   axc where
 =
a +
p
2a + 4
2
c
2
> c:
The coecient on xa is interpreted as the amount of information revealed about the product
quality.
Proposition 1 The monopoly advertisements contain less information about the product
quality than the socially optimal advertisements.
Lewis and Sappington (1994) examine the amount of information a monopoly rm might
27Milgrom and Roberts (1986) analyze a model in which the rm chooses its price and consumers draw
product-quality inferences from price as well as advertisement. Although such a \signaling eect" of action
is important in a number of dierent contexts such as monetary policy (see, Baeriswyl and Cornand (2010)),
it requires dierent techniques and is beyond the scope of the present paper.
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provide to potential buyers. In their setting, each buyer privately observes an imperfect
signal about his valuation and the rm controls the precision of the signals. Anderson
and Renault (2006) and Johnson and Myatt (2006) distinguish the informational content of
advertisements (e.g., price vs. attributes and hype vs. real information, respectively). In our
model, the rm should disclose a one-dimensional index constructed from its product quality
and marginal cost and control the variances and covariance of the \market expectations."
6.2 Campaign Advertising and Incumbency Advantage
The population consists of two groups of voters, indexed by i 2 f1; 2g. These groups
dier in their policy preferences over a one-dimensional policy space. Let q1 =  12 and q2 = 12
be the preferred policies of groups 1 and 2, respectively. As in Prat (2002), voters also judge
candidates in another dimension, say valence, which represents the general competence of a
candidate such as negotiating ability, leadership, and integrity. Unlike policy preferences, all
voters' preferences are the same in the valence dimension.
Two parties compete against each other in an election. An incumbent runs from the ruling
party and a challenger from the opposition party. The ruling party is privately informed
about the characteristics of the incumbent and makes campaign advertising that may reveal
information about him. The incumbent is characterized by two parameters (x; y) where
x 2 [ 1
2
; 1
2
] represents his policy stance and y 2 [ 1
2
; 1
2
] represents his valence. Assume that
x and y have zero means and are independent of each other. The ex ante distribution of
(x; y) is common knowledge, but its realization is observed only by the ruling party. We
address the optimal campaign policy for the ruling party that maximizes the probability of
reelection in the absence of the opposition party's campaign.28 A possible interpretation of
the campaign strategy is such that the party chooses topics discussed in a meeting and in
candidates' speeches.
When the incumbent of type (x; y) is elected, voters in group i 2 f1; 2g receive utility
ui =  jx   qij + y. On the other hand, when the challenger is elected, they receive ui =
 j0  qij+ ti where ti is a private information of group i that represents an ideological bias
toward the challenger. We assume that ti is independent of t i and is uniformly distributed
over [  1
2h
; 1
2h
] for a suciently small h > 0.29 Thus, given m and ti, voters in group i vote
for the ruling party if E[ui(x; y)jm]   j0  qij+ ti.
The timing of the game is summarized as follows. The ruling party commits to a disclosure
rule. The ruling party observes the incumbent's type (x; y) and publicly discloses a message
28Information disclosure by multiple senders raises a new issue and is beyond the scope of the paper. A
recent work of Gentzkow and Kamenica (2011) tackles such a problem.
29For h 2 (0; 12 ), the interior solution is guaranteed.
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m according to the disclosure rule. The noise variables (t1; t2) are realized. Given m and ti,
each voter votes for the candidate he prefers. If both groups vote for the same candidate, he
wins with probability one. If two groups disagree, then the incumbent wins with probability
 2 [0; 1].
Let x^ = E[xjm] and y^ = E[yjm]. The voters' expected utility from the incumbent
conditional on m is written as
E[ui(x; y)jm] =
8<: (12 + x^) + y^ for group 1 (1
2
  x^) + y^ for group 2
The probability P1 (P2) that voters in group 1 (group 2) vote for the incumbent is given
by P1 =
1
2
+ h(y^   x^) (P2 = 12 + h(y^ + x^), respectively). The conditional probability P (m)
that the incumbent wins given message m is
P (m) =P1P2 +  (1  P1)P2 +  P1(1  P2)
=
1 + 2 
4
+ hy^ + (1  2 )h2(y^ + x^)(y^   x^):
Thus, we have v^(x^; y^) = (1 2 )h2(y^2  x^2). Since we assume that x and y are independent,
we nd the following result.30
Proposition 2 When the incumbent has an advantage (  1
2
), then it is optimal for the
ruling party to reveal only the incumbent's policy stance (g(x; y) = x).
Intuitively, when the incumbent has an advantage, the ruling party has an incentive to
increase the probability that at least one group prefers the incumbent to the challenger even
though it decreases the probability of unanimity. Consequently, the incumbency advantage
impairs the selection of a competent candidate through the campaign strategy that reveals
no information about the valence characteristics. We also predict that the opposition party
needs to attract both groups of voters and has an incentive to reveal the valence dimension
of the candidates; for example, revealing scandals involving the incumbent and emphasizing
his inconsistent statements.
Similar situations arise in dierent contexts. For example, in a criminal court, a defense
attorney who needs to persuade only a part of juries is better o making an emotional appeal
to them while a prosecutor who needs to avoid a conict among juror is better o gathering
objective evidence of guilt. In this case, the voting procedure determines the incentives of
information revelation by the prosecutor and the attorney.
30Note that the result does not depend on the marginal distributions of x and y.
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Polborn and Yi (2006) analyze information revelation in a political campaign assuming
that each candidate must truthfully reveal either positive or negative information. Coate
(2004) and Galeotti and Mattozzi (2011) analyze informative campaign which perfectly re-
veals the candidate's policy position to a fraction of voters while Prat (2002) analyzes cam-
paign advertising when the campaign expenditures signal the candidate's valence.
6.3 Central Bank Transparency
We examine how central bank transparency aects the volatility of the output gap and
ination and characterize the optimal disclosure rule and monetary policy. As in Geraats
(2002) and Jensen (2002), we consider a simple two-period model where period 1 is regarded
as the present and period 2 as the future.
The private sector behavior is summarized by a standard Phillips curve31
lt = t   EPt 1t + "t
where lt is (log) employment in period t, t is the ination rate in period t (the change in the
log price level between period t  1 and t), and "t is an employment shock (a supply shock).
The expectation operator EPt 1[] denotes the market expectation formed in period t  1.
The central bank has perfect control over ination t = it where it is the central bank's
intended ination.32 We assume that the central bank can commit to a contingent monetary
policy in the short-run, but cannot commit to the future policy. For example, career concerns
of the policymakers may prevent discretionary policymaking in the short-run, but in the
future the composition of the policymaker board may alter and an alternative policy plan
may be chosen. Moreover, an unpredictable change in economic and political conditions may
make the initial plan totally inadequate.
The central bank's loss function is E[L1 + L2] where  2 (0; 1) is the discount factor
and Lt is the period t loss function
Lt = 
2
t + (lt   lt )2
for some  > 0. The employment target lt can be interpreted as a demand shock due to
stochastic preferences of the representative household or as the central bank's preference
shock due to a change in the degree of central bank independence.
31The description of the economy is based on Faust and Svensson (2001).
32Faust and Svensson (2001) assume that the central bank has imperfect control over ination so that
t = it + t where t is a control error.
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We assume that the supply shock and the employment target are independent and nor-
mally distributed with mean zero. In particular, we assume that l1  N(0; 2l ) and "1 
N(0; 2"), and that these shocks evolve according to "t+1 = ""t + t+1 and l

t+1 = ll

t + t+1
where t+1 and t+1 are independent shocks with mean zero and l; " 2 ( 1; 1).
The timing of events is as follows. The central bank chooses a disclosure rule (;M)
and a short-run monetary policy plan i1 : R2 M ! R which depends on the realization
of the supply and demand shocks and the message disclosed. The state of nature (l1; "1) is
realized and a message m 2M is publicly announced according to (;M). The central bank
sets a short-run monetary policy i1(l

1; "1;m), and the ination rate 1 is determined. Given
m and i1(l

1; "1;m), the private sector forms an expectation about the future ination rate
EP1 [2]. In period 2, the central bank chooses a policy i2 given the realization of (l2; "2) and
the market expectation.
In period 2, the central bank's problem is given by
min
i2
22 + (l2   l2)2
subject to l2 = 2   EP1 2 + "2
2 = i2:
From the rst-order condition and the rational expectation, we have
2 =

1 + 
h
(l^2   "^2) + (l2   "2)
i
l2   l2 = 
1
1 + 
h
(l^2   "^2) + (l2   "2)
i
where y^  EP1 y denotes the market expectation of a random variable y formed in period 1.
The loss in period 2 is given by
L2 =

1 + 
h
(l^2   "^2) + (l2   "2)
i2
:
We now consider the short-run monetary policy and optimal disclosure rule, which solve
the following problem
min
i1();(;M)
E[21 + (l1   l1)2] + EL2(l^2; "^2; l2; "2)
subject to l1 = 1   EP0 1 + "1
1 = i1(l

1; "1;m):
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Note that we can restrict our search for optimal short-run policy plans to the class of m-
measurable functions without loss of generality. To see this, consider a disclosure rule (;M)
and a short-run policy plan i1 : R2M ! R. The private sector observes m and i1(l1; "1;m),
and forms an expectation (l^2; "^2). Now consider a disclosure rule (~;M  R) where the
message is given by ~m = (m; i1(l

1; "1;m)), and a ~m-measurable policy ~i1( ~m) = i1(l

1; "1;m).
This pair of a disclosure rule and a policy plan is essentially identical to the initial pair
((;M); i1) in the sense that the information revealed to the private sector and the short-
run monetary policy in period 1 are the same almost surely. Therefore we rst characterize
the optimal short-run policy plan given each disclosure rule, and then nd the optimal
disclosure rule.
Fix a disclosure rule (;M). From the rst-order condition, the optimal short-run policy
i1() is given by
i1(l^

1; "^1) =

1 + 
(l^1   "^1);
and the ex ante expected loss is
EL1 + EL2 =E(l1   "1)2  
2
1 + 
E(l^1   "^1)2
+ 


1 + 
(l2   "2)2 +
2(2 + )
1 + 
E(l^2   "^2)2

:
Recall that l^2 = EP1 [l2] = l l^1 and "^2 = EP1 ["2] = ""^1. Then we have
V =
2
1 + 
 
1  1
 1 1
!
  
2(2 + )
1 + 
 
2l  l"
 l" 2"
!
: (5)
Since det(V ) =  (2+)4
(1+)2
(l   ")2  0, the following statement holds.
Proposition 3 A linear rule of rank 1 is optimal whenever l 6= ".
The central bank needs to respond to the shocks (l1; "1) to stabilize the output gap.
On the other hand, it should avoid information revelation about the future policy since it
weakens the policy eectiveness in the future. This trade-o makes partial revelation optimal
in the generic case where l 6= ".
To make this point clear, suppose that l = 1 and " = 0. Then
W = 
1
2V 
1
2 =
2
1 + 
 
2l (1  (2 + ))  l"
 l" 2"
!
:
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From Corollary 3, the optimal linear rule g(l1; "1) = l

1   "1 where  2 (0; 1) is a decreasing
function of (2 + ) and ("=l).
33 As  increases, the information revelation about l1
becomes more costly and then the amount of information contained in the message, which
can be measured by , should decrease.34
Given the optimal linear rule, the short-run policy is written as
i1 =

1 + 
(l^1   "^1) =

1 + 
2l + 
2
"
22l + 
2
"
(l1   "1): (6)
As  increases, the stabilization policy becomes more responsive to l1, which increases E21
and decreases E(l1   l1)2. Intuitively, as the central bank becomes more myopic, the cost
from the output stabilization due to information revelation becomes less important. This
comparative statics is summarized as follows.35
Proposition 4 As the central bank becomes myopic, the output gap is stabilized while the
ination becomes volatile.
As illustrated above, our framework is useful to characterize the optimal monetary policy
that plays a signaling role as well as the stabilization role.36 Note that the optimal short-run
policy plan i1 is a linear function of the message m = l

1 "1 (see (6)). This implies that the
policy outcome i1(m) contains the same information as the message, and hence the optimal
disclosure rule and monetary policy are also implemented by committing to the optimal
short-run policy plan and making the policy outcome transparent.
A number of papers (e.g., Faust and Svensson (2001) and Jensen (2002) among others)
investigate the welfare eect of central bank transparency and the optimal monetary policy in
dierent transparency regimes. Unlike these papers which restrict communication strategies
available to the central bank to noisy communications, we characterize the optimal disclosure
rule and monetary policy plan in the general class of policies. Our analysis suggests that the
33An exact expression for  is
 =1  1
2
(1 + ("=l)
2 + (2 + ))
+
1
2
p
(1 + ("=l)2 + (2 + ))2   4(2 + ):
34The amount of information about the supply shock revealed is measured by the variability of the
conditional expectation of l1, var(E[l1jm]) = 24l =(22l + 2"), which is increasing in  2 (0; 1).
35In a similar manner, one can examine how the policy maker's preferences, parameterized by , aect
the monetary policy and central bank transparency.
36Recently, Baeriswyl and Cornand (2010) study this problem in the setting where the monetary policy
is imperfectly observed by the private sector.
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central bank should control the covariance of market expectations rather than the variance
of private sector forecast errors of each variable, written as var("  "^) and var(l   l^).
7 Conclusion
We study multidimensional information disclosure where the sender's expected utility
is expressed as the expected value of a function of the receivers' expectations of the state.
The semidenite programming is applied to identifying necessary conditions for the second
moment of the conditional expectations that can be induced by the disclosure rule and char-
acterizing an upper bound of the sender's expected utility. We characterize the optimal
disclosure rule among the general class of (possibly randomized) rules as a linear transfor-
mation of the state when it is normally distributed. Based on such a simple and tractable
characterization, we study several applications and provide interesting implications. Possible
directions for future work include studying settings with multiple senders and with receivers'
private information.
Appendix
A Proofs
Proof of Theorem 1. The if parts (the optimality of full/no disclosure when V is denite)
follow from Jensen's inequality and the only if parts (the optimality of partial disclosure
when V is indenite) are shown by constructing a rule that yields a higher gain than full/no
disclosure.
(i): if part. Suppose that V is positive semidenite. We will show that full disclosure is
optimal. If V is positive semidenite, or equivalently if v^ is a convex function, then, for any
disclosure rule (;M), we have from Jensen's inequality that Ev^(x^)  E[E[v^(x)jm]] = Ev^(x)
but the last is equal to the gain under full disclosure. Hence full disclosure is optimal.
(ii): if part. Suppose that V is negative semidenite. We will show that no disclosure is
optimal. If V is negative semidenite, or equivalently if v^ is a concave function, then, for
any disclosure rule (;M), we have Ev^(x^)  v^(Ex^) = v^(Ex) but the last is equal to the gain
under no disclosure. Hence no disclosure is optimal.
(i): only if part. Suppose that V is indenite. We will construct a partial disclosure that
attains a higher gain than full disclosure. Since V is not positive semidenite, there exists
a vector x  2 Rk such that x0 V x  < 0. Let Lx  be the linear subspace in Rk spanned by
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a vector x  and L?x  be the orthogonal complement of Lx  . Any point in R
k is represented
by the sum of vectors in Lx  and L
?
x  , as x = y + x  for some  2 R and y 2 L?x  .
Now consider a disclosure rule (;M) such that the sender discloses vector y 2 L?x  for
each realization of x. Under this rule, the receivers know on which line x is realized, but they
are still uninformed about  2 R. Thus xjm is distributed over a line through x^ parallel to
x , and hence we can write xjm  x^ as x  where  2 R is a corresponding random variable.
Now compare the gain Ev^(x) under full disclosure with the gain Ev^(x^) under rule (;M):
E[x0V x]  E[x^0V x^] =E[E[x0V xjm]  E[x^0V x^]]
=Em [E[(x  x^)0V (x  x^)jm]]
=Em

E[2x0 V x jm]

=x0 V x E2 < 0
where the inequality holds since  6= 0 almost surely.37
(ii): only if part. Suppose that V is indenite. We will construct a partial disclosure that
attains a higher gain than no disclosure, which equals zero. Let s 2 Sk 1 be a point in the
unit sphere in Rk and consider a disclosure rule under which the sender discloses the sign of
s0x 2 R.38 Let x^p = E[xjs0x  0] and x^n = E[xjs0x < 0].
Since V is not negative semidenite, there exists x+ 2 Rk such that x0+V x+ > 0. We
want to show that there exists s 2 Sk 1 such that x^p = spx+ and x^n = snx+ for some
sp; 
s
n 2 R.
Let B be a k  (k   1) matrix such that all its column vectors are orthogonal to x+.
Consider a function g : Rk 1 ! Rk 1 dened by g(s) = B0[E(xjs0x  0)   E(xjs0x < 0)].39
Since g is a continuous function from an (k 1)-sphere into Euclidean (k 1)-space, from the
Borsuk-Ulam theorem, there exists s 2 Sk 1 such that g(s) = g( s). However we know that
g( s) =  g(s).40 Therefore there exists s 2 Sk 1 such that g(s) =  g(s), which must be
equal to zero. Using the fact that Pr(s0x  0)E[xjs0x  0]+Pr(s0x < 0)E[xjs0x < 0] = Ex =
0, we have B0E[xjs0x  0] = B0E[xjs0x < 0] = 0. This implies that they are proportional to
x+; so we can write x^ = x+ where  2 fsp; sng is a corresponding random variable. Then
Ev^(x^) = E[2x0+V x+] > 0 = v^(Ex).
Proof of Theorem 2. First, we give a necessary condition for the solution, and then
37Note also that the second equality holds since Em[E[x^0V xjm]] = Em[E[x0V x^jm]] = Em[x^0V E[xjm]] =
Em[x^0V x^].
38Formally, for each s 2 Sk 1  Rk, dene (s; fm+;m g) by s(m+js0x  0) = 1, s(m js0x  0) = 0,
s(m+js0x < 0) = 0, and s(m js0x < 0) = 1.
39Note that for all s 2 Sk 1, E[xjm] 6= 0.
40This follows from B0[E(xj   s0x  0)  E(xj   s0x < 0)] = B0[E(xjs0x  0)  E(xjs0x > 0)]. Note that
fx : s0x = 0g has measure zero.
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establish the result.
Step 1 : We will show that Z is an orthogonal projection matrix whenever Z is a solution
to SDP. Since Z 2 Sk+ is a symmetric matrix, we have the eigenvalue decomposition Z =
CC 0 where C is an orthogonal matrix and  is a diagonal matrix with real entries.41 Z  O
implies that all eigenvalues are nonnegative (i  0 for every i), and I Z = C(I )C 0  O
implies that all eigenvalues must satisfy 1   i  0 for all i. From a property of the trace
operator, we have tr(WZ) = tr(WCC 0) = tr(C 0WC) =
Pk
i=1 ii where i is the i-th
diagonal entry of C 0WC. Now consider a matrix ~Z = C ~C 0 where ~ is a diagonal matrix
with each entry ~i being equal to 0 if i < 0 and 1 if i  0. By construction, we have
tr(WZ) =
P
ii 
P ~ii = tr(W ~Z). Since ~Z is a symmetric positive semidenite matrix
and furthermore is idempotent,42 the solution to SDP must be an orthogonal projection
matrix.43
Step 2 : We now show that for any orthogonal projection matrix Z of rank l, there
exists a k  l matrix D such that Z = QD(D0D) 1D0Q0 where Q = [q1; : : : ;qk] consists
of all eigenvectors of W . Since W is symmetric, we have the eigenvalue decomposition
W = Q
Q0 =
P
!iqiq
0
i.
Note that every orthogonal projection matrix is characterized by its target subspace in
Rk. Fix an arbitrary subspace in Rk and suppose that it is spanned by column vectors of
some k  l matrix B. Then the orthogonal projection matrix onto this subspace is written
as PB = B(B
0B) 1B0.44 Let D = Q0B. Then B = QD, and hence
PB =QD[(QD)
0(QD)] 1(QD)0
=QD[D0D] 1D0Q0
=QPDQ
0:
Step 3 : Assume, without loss of generality, that each eigenvalue !i is nonnegative for
i = 1; : : : ; r, and negative for i = r; : : : ; k. Let Q+  [q1; : : : ;qr] and Q   [qr+1; : : : ;qk].
Note that Q0Q = Ik implies Q0+Q+ = Ir and Q
0
+Q  = Or;k r. We will show that tr(WPQ+) 
tr(WPB) for any kk orthogonal projection matrix PB = QPDQ0. Recall that every diagonal
entry of PD satises 0  (PD)ii  1 since both PD and I   PD are positive semidenite.
41A matrix A is orthogonal if AA0 = I.
42A matrix A is idempotent if A2 = A. Note that ~Z2 = C ~C 0C ~C 0 = C ~2C 0 = ~Z since ~2 = ~.
43A matrix A is an orthogonal projection matrix if it is symmetric and idempotent.
44For any k  l matrix B of rank l, PB is symmetric and idempotent. Check P 0B = [B(B0B) 1B0]0 =
B(B0B) 1B0 and P 2B = B(B
0B) 1B0B(B0B) 1B0 = B(B0B) 1B0.
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Then
tr(WPB) =tr(Q
Q
0QPDQ0)
=tr(
PD)
=
kX
i=1
!i(PD)ii
!1 +   + !r:
Finally we check tr(WPQ+) =
Pr
i=1 !i.
tr(WPQ+) =tr(
Q
0Q+(Q0+Q+)
 1Q0+Q)
=tr
 


 
Q0+
Q0 
!
Q+(Q
0
+Q+)
 1Q0+

Q+ Q 
!
=tr
 


 
Ir
Ok r;r
!
Ir Or;k r
!
=tr
0BBBB@
0BBBB@
!1 0    0
0 !2    0
...
...
. . .
...
0 0    !k
1CCCCA
 
Ir Or;k r
Ok r;r Ok;k
!1CCCCA
=!1 +   + !r:
Thus we conclude that tr(WPQ+)  tr(WZ) for every orthogonal projection matrix Z.
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